What went wrong for the Raptors, and can they fix it?

The Raptors have much to fix on the roster. It's going to be tough.

I’ve never loved chips, but I always eat them when they’re in front of me. And not just one, but as much as is available without being rude and finishing an entire shared bowl. I don’t enjoy them, and they make me feel sick, and they have no nutritional value. I don’t know why I do it. I think it’s just being human?

If we’re going to diagnose the ills of the Toronto Raptors this season, it has to start there: eating the chips in front of them, feeling sick, and gaining no nutrition. But, also, understanding that this is partially just being human.

The Raptors had several major weaknesses coming into the season: Lack of rim protection on defense, lack of shooting on offense, and lack of rim pressure on offense. (There were other, more minor issues, such as depth or health, but those were less certainly going to trouble the Raptors coming into the season.) The Raptors had massively overachieved in 2021-22, to the extent of a 49-win season that launched the head ahead of its long-term curve (which Masai Ujiri has admitted) and convinced the brass that those issues could be overcome.

In the pros column entering 2022-23, the Raptors had carryover from the prior season (which usually is very predictive of success), veteran leadership that had previously won a championship, athletic defenders, a unique strategy on both ends that prioritized more shooting possessions than opponents, and Pascal Siakam. Those should, all else being equal, have overcome the weaknesses, right? They did in 2021-22. So why didn’t they in 2022-23?

Shockingly, little went wrong that was out of Toronto’s control. And many of the pros worked as well or better than expect. Toronto ranked fifth in minutes continuity entering 2022-23. The locker-room leadership, specifically Fred VanVleet and Siakam, seemed to keep the team together during difficult times — outwardly, at least, nothing fractured, particularly during the midseason lull that saw the defense collapse into a shrunken and shriveled caricature of itself. The defenders were, indeed, athletic, and O.G. Anunoby had the best defensive season of his career, led the league in steals, and could still end up with an All-Defense Team nod. The strategy worked as planned; Toronto attempted a ridiculous 737 more field-goal attempts than their opponents, the fourth-most in history and most of this millennium. (Their net field-goal margin was even 183 higher than it was the year prior.) Siakam had a career year.

But so much faded away around the margins. The point-of-attack defense — which had been a strength! — became a vapid hole, with VanVleet in particular experiencing a huge slide as his mobility guarding the ball, particularly in isolation, took a hit. Gary Trent jr. backslid. Siakam’s defensive effort waned to the extent that he was in all likelihood a net negative despite being at his best and most engaged one the league’s best defenders. Toronto’s touch from the short midrange — which had been league average — plummeted to the bottom of the league. Toronto’s ability to protect the paint had been tenuous but survivable, but it fell into the territory of desperation without Poeltl.

In many ways, the Raptors were already crawling on the edge of a knife. Stray but a little, and the quest was doomed to fail. And Toronto strayed in many, many ways.

Perhaps most significantly, the weaknesses not only remained unsolved, but in fact were exacerbated throughout the year. The shooting, already dangerously slim, fell off — particularly from VanVleet. Outside of garbage time, Toronto attempted the 26th-highest frequency of triples and was the 28th-most accurate. It doesn’t matter how many extra shots you attempt compared to opponents if you can’t score anyway. The rim pressure was slightly better, especially with Poeltl available as a roller, but no one beyond Siakam was really able to create for himself from a standstill and reach the rim.

And it all came to roost at the same time: Toronto was defeated in the play-in by poor (free throw) shooting, poor defense at the point of attack, and an inability from VanVleet to create anything on offense when switched against Nikola Vucevic. He is not a fleet-of-foot defender, yet Toronto couldn’t even touch the paint against Chicago’s 1-5 switching.

All in all, Toronto couldn’t fix its weaknesses, and neither could it make them irrelevant through improving its strengths. Which points to the obvious solution: fix the fucking weaknesses.

That actually shouldn’t be as difficult as it sounds. Most NBA players outside of Toronto are passable shooters! The Raptors need to acquire some. Many, many teams have more players than you can count on one hand who can — without any help from teammates or offensive structure — reach the rim and finish there. (The Raptors of course have one.) I pined for Lonnie Walker IV during the offseason — who may not have been perfect but at least was the correct player type. Malik Monk would have been even better, as smart insiders like Joe Wolfond and Samson Folk recognized before the season as well.

Some upcoming free agents could help Toronto. Jevon Carter is an excellent shooter and even better point-of-attack defender. He offers little creation, but if Toronto wants to funnel more touches to Siakam and Barnes, he would fit well. (He would actually hurt Toronto’s rim pressure, but it’s hard to find low-cost players who would help address every problem.) Theo Pinson and Shake Milton are underrated and likely low-cost off-the-bench guards with creation and shooting chops. Jaylen Nowell would be a home run. What’s the story with Nickeil Alexander-Walker — he’s a restricted free agent, but would an offer sheet of the full midlevel exception pry him to Toronto? (I doubt it, but he would fill a lot of needs for the Raptors.)

If Toronto hit around the edges, that would certainly help. The team desperately needs to start hitting around the edges again! But because of Toronto’s commitment to its current process and extended timeline for analyzing and judging, the financial bill for this team is already come due. Poeltl is an unrestricted free agent, and Trent and VanVleet have player options they are likely to decline for more money. Next offseason Siakam will be an unrestricted free agent, Achiuwa will be restricted, and Anunoby will have a player option he is likely to decline for more money. All, if they remain Raptors, will require raises. At the same time MLSE has indicated that it will not go into the luxury tax for a middling team, because this team was proven middling, the Raptors will not pay to keep all of their talent. Ujiri said as much in his media availability after the trade deadline, admitting that he and his staff had a lot of work to do this offseason. He said that the middle of the season was not the right time to made big decisions about the future of a franchise.

Which means Toronto has some even more difficult choices to make now. Some players can be traded for plenty of assets (Anunoby, Barnes, or Siakam), while others can be let go for none or sign-and-traded for few assets (VanVleet, Trent, Poeltl). Losing any of those players will hurt Toronto in the short term. But it’s a necessity, at this point, given MLSE’s financial priorities and Toronto’s inability to build a contending team with this roster construction.

So as for big moves, the Raptors have basically infinite options. Or, given the necessity of other teams saying yes to a deal, an unknowable number of options. But the structure of a deal that would address Toronto’s weaknesses is still clear. Losing Siakam would devastate Toronto’s ability to create in the half-court. Losing VanVleet would devastate Toronto’s shooting. Losing Anunoby would devastate both — he is the Raptors’ best non-Poeltl finisher and best shooter, statistically. There is no way for the Raptors to trade one of those players (or a sign-and-trade in the case of VanVleet) and improve in the short term, barring one of the players coming back being unexpectedly good.

Toronto almost certainly won’t lose Poeltl — it would be such a disaster for asset management after trading for him that it would almost jeopardize the front office members’ job statuses. Losing Trent unfortunately seems likely, as he is the one Raptor of the upcoming free agents who has fallen out of the starting lineup, who has lost touches and minutes, and who wasn’t drafted by the team. Losing Barnes would be an unmitigated disaster for Toronto’s long-term outlook, even if he didn’t do as much as his fellow core players to pressure the rim or space the floor. (His outrageous play-making, decision-making, and broken-play domination are, at this point, ceiling raisers. Toronto is not yet good enough for its ceiling to really matter all that much.)

If there were a Sabonis-for-Haliburton type of move available for Toronto, that could perhaps address the team’s weaknesses. Those are hard to identify, and harder to swing, but it’s possible. I’ve wanted Zach LaVine for a while on the Raptors, and I think he would address a number of the team’s issues. I don’t really see a framework for that deal — technically Siakam for LaVine works financially, but I see a million reasons why that would be a bad deal for both teams, especially Toronto, and only a very few either would say yes. If you really really squint, Siakam and Barnes play the same position (like Sabonis and Turner), neither spaces the floor for the other, and LaVine would uncork Toronto’s offense, even if he’s not nearly the passer Toronto would want. Still, I don’t think Toronto would say yes to that deal. Do the Hawks want to move on from Trae Young? He would help Toronto’s offense. Again though, the deal would probably have to be for Siakam. Don’t see Toronto saying yes to that one.

To make trading one of Toronto’s core players realistic, the team would need to hit on a player who gets better in Toronto. Would New York go absolutely insane, black out, and trade Obi Toppin or Immanuel Quickley or Quentin Grimes. No, absolutely not. For Barnes? Both teams shoot that down immediately, but wow Quickley and Grimes especially would solve things for Toronto. Bradley Beal is un-trade-for-able. Maybe Cleveland loses big in the playoffs and panics and doesn’t want Darius Garland and Donovan Mitchell, so they trade Garland in the summer? Ha, not likely, but he would fix Toronto. Will Karl-Anthony Towns eventually get traded after his restriction expires at the end of June? He, too, could help fix the offense — but Toronto would still need a guard with a whole lot of juice. Samson, when I asked him, mentioned Andrew Nembhard as a guy who could get traded and become a star, which I truly believe, but I cannot be convinced the Pacers trade him come hell or high water. Joe Wolfond said Devin Vassell when I asked him, which, I guess the Spurs don’t want to have good players, and he is a good player. I can see it!

But even hitting around the edges and swinging a miracle trade wouldn’t fix everything. Let’s say the Raptors sign Alexander-Walker and trade for LaVine, the team would still be massively over the salary cap. Even letting Trent walk and releasing Thaddeus Young, they would still be, probably, just below the luxury tax bill with a huge raise coming soon for Anunoby. Maybe the team is better (I doubt it, LaVine does stuff Siakam doesn’t do, but Siakam is a better player), but at the cost of trading a home-grown star, and it certainly wouldn’t, even with the most optimistic outlook, be a championship contender. Or if the Raptors wanted to be better, and trade Anunoby or even Barnes instead of Siakam, then they would be fielding an even more expensive roster the following season. At best, the Raptors would buy themselves another year before having to face the same questions.

Which is really the best outlook at the moment, in terms of building this team back to the championship stage. Toronto can kick the can down the road this offseason, certainly. It can downgrade and offload one of its core players for nothing (the San Antonio Spurs have cap space!) to become tangibly worse and try again in a few years, perhaps with lower ticket prices. (That’s the most unrealistic part of this whole exercise.) It can convince MLSE to pay everyone. (Ha, no, that’s the most unrealistic part of this whole exercise.) Those seem like the only options?

(Yes, it’s worth mentioning now that it’s possible that Barnes, Anunoby, Achiuwa, and Christian Koloko all take monstrous leaps and launch Toronto into the stratosphere. It’s technically possible. After this season, I don’t think it would be reasonable for Toronto to bet the farm on it.)

All this to say, I imagine the Raptors take the middle-of-the-road option. That’s kind of what this front office does. They can try to swing a clever signing or two and a nifty draft pick at the end of the lottery to rebuild depth. They can let one or more of the free agents walk. You might prefer VanVleet, which would definitely hurt this team in the short term, but he cannot be the only guard on this team for it to be competitive. Maybe they don’t make any trades and decide to run it back with a new coach (more on that in a future piece). But at this point it should be clear Toronto can’t fix its issues in one offseason. There are too many players about to get paid for that to happen. The Raptors made a sizeable bet on length, athleticism, defensive creativity, and internal development, and the bet didn’t pay off. Now the team is left trying to escape Vegas with its pants. It’s possible they do so. But Ujiri and company will be treading an even finer line this offseason than the Raptors did during the season. For Toronto to contend for a championship in the near future, he will have to succeed doing an even more difficult job than the one his team failed to accomplish this season.