Fans are always making a lot of hubbub [all the time] around the trade deadline.
Everyone has an opinion. Rightfully, so. It’s kinda their job. To be passionately pleased and displeased. Self-righteously right. Unapologetically wrong.
Doubt was especially on display this past Thursday when the Toronto Raptors acquired Brandon Ingram.
Concern was warranted.
For one, Toronto – fifth-worst record in the league at the time – looked to be hitting the Draft Lottery hard. With a few “additions-by-subtraction” at the trade deadline, some timely “injuries”, and an emphasis on playing the young guys, tanking would be in full motion. The sudden addition of a 27-year-old All-Star entering his prime hampered all that.
For two, and, perhaps, most significantly, Brandon Ingram was perceived as a negative asset. It seemed like no one wanted him. Not New Orleans, who refused to re-sign him. Not anyone else in the league – based on a lack of speculation and reporting.
The Toronto Raptors, seeing a buy-low opportunity, swooped in.
There are legitimate reasons why Ingram’s trade value dropped. He’s often injured (he’s been out with an ankle injury since December 7, 2024). He’s not played on many “winning” teams. His game is “antiquated” (a slow-it-down-mid-range-killer type). His defence mild. His effort fluctuates. His style of play “lacks adaptability”. And, he wants to get paid stacks – don’t we all?
Despite the criticisms, Ingram’s offensive talent is unassailable. (Louis Zatzman does a wonderfully deep analysis of Ingram’s fit with the Raptors.) He’s scored 20+ points and averaged at least five assists on 52% effective field goal percentage for the last four seasons. This year even, Ingram is one of fourteen players to average more than 27% usage, 52% effective field goal percentage, and 26% assist percentage.
The reality is that Ingram being untradeable had less to do with his capabilities and more to do with the untimely arrival of the new Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) and the “new NBA landscape”.
The CBA’s new rules sought to limit the advantages of big-market teams by penalizing those indifferent to luxury taxation [Huzzah! for taxing the wealthy!]. Now, any team spending beyond the first, and then, the second Apron thresholds is also severely restricted in the moves they can make.
The rules’ effects have, perhaps, swung the state of the League too far in the other direction. Now, teams are petrified of committing themselves to large contracts and desperate to avoid the Apron System.
Even “win now”, “all-in” teams fear it.
Memphis’ – a top-three team in the West – only significant trade this year was unloading Marcus Smart to create cap space for the summer. Teams expecting Conference Finals or bust – Boston, Denver, Oklahoma City, Houston, and New York – did, virtually, nothing.
In fact, the majority of deals this deadline were to soften cap situations not to improve rosters. Most who did make “competitive” trades – Cleveland, Golden State, Los Angeles Clippers, and Milwaukee – also alleviated cap stress in the process.
I mentioned this last Wednesday: the Apron System was one of two opposing forces affecting the NBA trade deadline (the other being parity). Its prominence is so great that players’ value is, more than ever, as much about on-court skill as it is about financial and systemic fit now and into the future.
Ingram was a victim of this shifting regulatory paradigm. His expiring contract and upcoming free agency arise at a time when [most] teams are spending more warily than ever or are punished harshly if they don’t.
As a result, few could afford Ingram. For contenders, Ingram’s $38 million contract was impossible to match without swapping out a core player (teams past the first and second Apron cannot aggregate contracts). Teams “one piece away” simply sought cheaper, plug’n’play guys to enhance rotations. Rebuilders, conversely, remained focused on their future and not interested in re-signing a guy nine years into the league.
That left teams neither contending nor rebuilding, per se. Teams on journeys to discover their identities. Teams with foundational talent still searching for what will bring it all together. Teams willing to take chances on talent and figure out the rest later. Teams like Toronto [and Atlanta, another team rumoured to be interested in Ingram].
Toronto’s circumstances are most unique to the league. “Big Free Agency” is not an avenue to acquire cornerstone players. The Raptors must do so through trade and draft.
And, when they do trade for players, the Raptors, typically, have two criteria in mind: paying low to hit big and a player’s Bird’s Rights (a rule allowing teams to re-sign free agents to contracts exceeding the salary cap).
It’s a dangerous approach, especially, when a new, juicy contract is imminent. Buying low means the path forward is unproven, or the path getting there was rocky. The Raptors’ record in this regard is mixed depending on how one evaluates the tenures of Gary Trent Jr., Precious Achiuwa, Immanuel Quickely, RJ Barrett, Davion Mitchel, Ochai Agbaji, among others.
But at a general disadvantage when it comes to acquiring NBA talent, the Raptors must seize upon major upside opportunities when they present themselves.
[Fast forward to 1:12 on “rebuilding”]
Brandon Ingram is the latest to follow Toronto’s modus operandi. His “value” as an elite, unicorn-sized scorer was at an all-time low. Few saw enough, recently, to be convinced of his long-term upside. Add the new oppressive cap rules and Ingram got squeezed.
Toronto gauged the league’s lack of interest accordingly. Their conclusion, it seems, is the league perceived Ingram’s talent and who he can, still, eventually become as a player inaccurately. They seized upon a market abnormality – as they tend to do – and made a gamble.
One of hubris or shrewdness?
Only time will tell.
