During his media day press conference, Raptors Head Coach Darko Rajakovic brought up the idea of the MIG, or ‘Most Important Guy’ when asked about the team’s approach on defense heading into the season. Typically, as Rajakovic laid out, the ‘MIG’ is the rim protector on any NBA team, deterring the easiest shots on offense. However, the Raptors wanted to flip that on its head and make the ‘MIG’ the on-ball defender this season to heighten the importance of having a sturdy point-of-attack defense and develop an identity as such.
That hasn’t worked out.
Not only are the Raptors a bottom-five defensive team this season, allowing over 117 points per 100 possessions nightly, but their ‘MIG’ philosophy has been lost in the shuffle, misplaced like your luggage at Pearson Airport. It’s led to some abhorrent defensive performances. They’ve conceded over 120 points in nine of their last 15 games, 130-plus in five of those, including allowing a franchise-worst 155 points to the Memphis Grizzlies and losing by a franchise-worst 54 points against the Boston Celtics on New Year’s Eve.
One could argue that their last two wins — an impressive routing of those same Celtics and Chris Boucher beating the Warriors — are a sign that things are trending up. After all, they limited Boston to under 100 points and only gave up 104 to Steph Curry and the Dubs.
But there is a reason: their best ‘MIG,’ Davion Mitchell, was present. Mitchell has been in and out of the rotation for the last couple of weeks until recently, when he stepped back into a starting role for the injured Immanuel Quickley. It’s no surprise that the Raptors allow nearly four points less on defense when Mitchell is on the floor — the second-best mark on the team behind Scottie Barnes (we’ll get to him in a second) — according to Cleaning The Glass.
He’s one of the only players on the team that can successfully embody the ‘MIG’ approach the Raptors are deploying on the ball. And even so, it’s resulted in inconsistent efforts when Mitchell is playing, as seen by their latest loss to the Milwaukee Bucks, where they gave up 130 points… again.
Otherwise, the Raptors consistently struggle to keep the ball in front of them. And there’s a trickle-down effect to this that can be seen in one specific defensive stat:
Opponent 3-point shooting.
The Raptors’ inability to stay with their man on-ball leads to a more scramble-heavy defense that is forced to help on drives, leading to conceding dubious amounts of threes.
Toronto gives up the 23rd most threes in the league. They concede the sixth-most ‘open’ threes, which, by the NBA’s definition, is a defender being 4-6 feet away from the shooter. Digging even deeper, they give up the 3rd-most corner threes in the NBA, and opposing teams shoot 40% on those looks, 23rd in the league. As far as ‘shot quality’ goes, opponents get the fourth-most quality looks across the league against the Raptors.
This defensive shot profile is comparable to the Oklahoma City Thunder, who are right next to the Raptors in terms of the amount of corner threes they give up. But the Thunder, who boast the best defense in the NBA this season (and perhaps in the history of the league), do this by design. Their on-ball defense applies relentless and calculated pressure meant to suffocate offenses, and their off-ball rotations are on a string, making even the easiest corner three difficult. OKC leads the entire league in deflections by a healthy amount, and while the Raptors are in the top ten, they fall incredibly short of being calculated and connected on defense like their counterpart, the Thunder.
It’s become a vicious cycle. An on-ball defender gets beat at the point-of-attack, off-ball defenders will pinch in to provide help and they concede open threes because of it.
They’re stuck in no man’s land.
Some examples:
Jamal Shead gets laid out on this screen by Goga Bitadze, Ja’Kobe Walter pinches in to help on this Corey Joseph drive (rookie move), and it leads to an open Tristan Da Silva three.
Barnes and Ochai Agbaji miscommunicate on a switch here, and it leads to the Raptors scrambling, Quickley has to stunt and recover off the corner, and it leads to a corner three for Da Silva.
The Raptors completely blow the coverage on this Knicks double-drag screen (looking at you Gradey), and Mikal Bridges just cuts backdoor; Barrett and Barnes both help off the corner and it’s an open three for Hart (it could have also been Anunoby).
Darius Garland rejects the screen, blows by Quickley, Boucher helps off the strong-side corner (bad move) and it leads to a Strus three. You can see Scottie yelling at him afterward to stay home on the shooter, especially when it’s one pass away.
There are breakdowns like this every game. And it’s because the skill set of the personnel on the roster doesn’t have the qualities to play this ultra-aggressive style of on-ball defense.
Admittedly, the caveat here is that this is a young team. And what Rajakovic and the coaching staff are trying to do by placing importance on the ball is instilling the correct principles to eventually, one day, improve.
But the idea of the ‘MIG’ being the on-ball defender seemed doomed from its inception.
Square peg, round hole.
Between Jakob Poeltl and Barnes, the Raptors have what it takes to be more conservative defensively and lean on their two frontcourt players to spring into action off-ball and clean things up. It’s a recipe that’s worked for years for the Milwaukee Bucks with Brook Lopez and Giannis Antetokounmpo (although it worked much better when they also had the on-ball prowess of Jrue Holiday; it’s a team sport for a reason, people!).
Barnes and Poeltl do a good job of swallowing up guards and forwards on drives. Barnes uses his length to funnel players to the basket, and Poeltl is there to clean it up.
There is a lot of pressure on Barnes to save the day defensively around the perimeter, especially in this scramble style of defense the Raptors play.
But, there’s a reason the Raptors are nearly 6 points per 100 possessions better on defense with him on the floor, the best mark on the team. When he’s engaged and using his length, they’re at their best on that end.
Barnes can, to a degree, compensate for the Raptors’ lapses on-ball with his hyperactivity off of it. But imagine if the Raptors leaned into that by pro-actively funneling players into Barnes (and Poeltl) instead of having lapses on defense that resulted in that.
So, what is the takeaway here?
Well, first, the Raptors aren’t a good defensive team.
But second, the process by which they approach defense is flawed. They put pressure on the ball and aren’t connected enough as a collective to spring into action off of it. They have two frontcourt players in Barnes and Poeltl, who could be better used in a more conservative-style defense.
Perhaps there is still time. It’s important to note that the Raptors have not been healthy enough to develop the chemistry needed to be on a string defensively and deploy the stylistic approach they’re experimenting with. And it remains to be seen whether, even at full strength, the Raptors can muster up what it requires to be successful or even competent.
This is more of a developmental question than anything, but do you put players in positions to succeed by leaning into their strengths, or do you put them in adverse situations so they can learn new skills?
The Raptors, as of now, are doing the latter defensively and hoping that, in the long term, they’re better for it.
It might be hard to parse through their current structure on that end and see the light at the end of the tunnel: a world in which the Raptors are hyperactive on the ball, flying out for close-outs and x-outs, covering ground with their length and athleticism and walling off the paint with their size.
But to Rajakovic’s point on media day, it all starts with what they do on the ball. Mano e Mano.
Maybe with time, they improve. After all, experience is the best teacher.
But as of now, their ‘Most Important Guy’ is failing them.
